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El papel de las reglas de política monetaria, para explicar el 
comportamiento de los bancos centrales, ha recibido una atención 
creciente en los últimos años. El caso español podría resultar de 
interés dado que, con una inflación superior a la media europea, ha 
sido capaz de conducir la política monetaria y controlar la inflación 
para participar en la unión monetaria europea. Pero tras la adopción 
de la política monetaria del Banco Central Europeo en enero de 1999, 
se observa una inflación más alta. En este trabajo exploramos si la 
política monetaria llevada a cabo por el Banco de España habría 
seguido una regla de política monetaria, y hasta qué punto las reglas 
monetarias contribuyen a alcanzar el objetivo de inflación.  




The role of monetary policy rules to explain the behaviour of central 
banks has received an increasing attention during the last few years. 
The Spanish case could be of interest given that, with an inflation 
above the European average, was able to conduct its monetary policy 
and to control the inflation in order to join the European monetary 
union. But after the adoption of the European Central Bank’s 
monetary policy in January 1999, a higher inflation can be observed. 
In this paper we explore whether the monetary policy performed by 
the Bank of Spain would have follow a monetary policy rule, and to 
which extent monetary rules contribute to achieve the goal of 
inflation. 
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1 Introduction 
  The role of monetary policy rules to explain the behaviour of central banks has received 
an increasing attention during the last few years. Among those rules, the contribution made by 
Taylor (1993) have attracted considerable interest of policymakers, central banks' governors 
and, also, of the academic community. 
  Instead of the well-known monetary rules based on the control of a monetary aggregate, 
Taylor rule recommend a setting for the level of the short-term interest rate based on the state of 
the economy and compatible with the macroeconomic objectives of short-run stability policy 
and long-run control of inflation. 
  Therefore, Taylor rule goes beyond strict monetary rules -like that proposed by 
Friedman (1959)- on behalf of a kind of rule more flexible and that allows for a larger degree of 
discretionality to central banks to adjust monetary policy to unexpected events. Thus, Taylor-
type rules are understood as systematic answers of monetary policy to the state of the economy 
* The previous versions of this paper benefited from comments by Oscar Bajo-Rubio and Ramon María-
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and, in this respect, they can be seen as rules of behaviour instead of explicit link's rules (see 
Erias and Sánchez, 1998). 
  There have been many theoretical (e.g., Svensson (1997) and Ball (1999)) and empirical 
works (e.g., Judd and Rudebusch (1998), Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000), Batini and 
Haldane (1999), Nelson (2000) or Gerlach y Schnabel (2000)) that have tried to assess how well 
Taylor-type rules can explain the monetary policy performed by the main central banks in the 
last few years. Furthermore, other works have evaluated the robustness of rule recommendations 
to changes in rule specifications (Kozicki, 1999) or have compared the performance of the 
Taylor rule in the United States and in Europe (Doménech, Ledo y Taguas, 2002). 
  In this paper we try to evaluate whether the monetary policy performed by the Bank of 
Spain during the period 1978-1998, could be described by a Taylor-type rule taking into account 
the opening process that the Spanish economy undertook during that years and, therefore, his 
increasing level of internationalisation. The Spanish case could be of interest given that, with 
inflation above the European average, was able to conduct its monetary policy and to control 
the inflation in order to join the European monetary union. But after the adoption of the 
European Central Bank’s monetary policy in January 1999, a higher inflation can be 
observed. In this paper we explore whether the monetary policy performed by the Bank of 
Spain would have follow a monetary policy rule, and to which extent monetary rules 
contribute to achieve the goal of inflation.  
  We have used quarterly data to estimate an equation for nominal short-term interest rate 
that depends on the deviation of inflation rate from a given target and the deviation of real 
output from its long-run sustainable trend. In that way, we try to estimate the monetary policy 
rule that the Bank of Spain could have followed during that period. 
  As far as we know, there are no other works that have made such attempt for the 
Spanish economy. Thus, there are studies that estimate equations for interest rate in Spain but 
with the different aim of checking the effect that other variables, mainly public deficit, can exert 
on interest rates (e.g., Raymond and Palet (1990), Ballabriga and Sebastián (1993) and Esteve 
and Tamarit (1994, 1996)). A nearly approach to ours is that of Escrivá and Santos (1991). They 
try to estimate a reaction function for interest rate when they examine the changes that have 
taken place in monetary control in Spain. In this case, the difference between this work and our 
is that, instead of checking whether Spanish monetary policy can be characterised by a Taylor-
type rule which is the main aim of our work, they try to distinguish different periods in 
from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, through the project SEC2002-01892.centrA:
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monetary policy in Spain between 1984 and 1988 from the evolution of the interbank lending 
rate settle by the Bank of Spain. 
  Following Clarida, Galí y Gertler (2000), we estimate the short run nominal interest rate 
for two periods of the sample. The choice of the periods depends on the changes brought about 
in the monetary policy designed by the Bank of Spain. The first period (1978:1-1982:2) can be 
described by the usual features that are present in a “closed economy” (Ayuso and Escrivá, 
1997), whereas the second period (1982:3-1998:4) is dominated by the usual features of an 
“open economy”, that was also subject to the rate of exchange commitments that arose from the 
entry of the peseta into the 'Exchange Rate Mechanism' of the European Monetary System. 
  The results for the first period show that the interest rate evolution and perform of the 
monetary policy by the Bank of Spain cannot be well characterised by a Taylor-type rule, 
whereas the opposite holds for the second period. 
  The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we shortly review the Taylor 
rule and the related literature. Next, we propose a reaction function for the Bank of Spain 
monetary policy in section 3, estimating several extensions of the baseline specification. The 
implications of Taylor-type rules for controlling inflation are analysed in section 4. Concluding 
remarks are presented in section 5.  
 
2 The Taylor rule 
  The Taylor rule (1993)
1 tries to approach the adjustment of short-term nominal interest 
rate by the monetary authorities in response to: a) the gap between the current inflation rate and 
a given target for inflation, and b) the output gap, that is, the relative difference between real 
and potential output level. So, these variables become the main objectives of monetary policy 
and it's assumed that the central bank can affect these objectives by changing interest rates. 
  In the simplest analytical form, the Taylor rule can be expressed as follows: 
(1)              ) ( ) )( 1 (
* *
t t t t t t y y R r − + − − + + = γ π π β π  
or, alternatively,  
(2)              ) ( ) ( ) (
* * *
t t t t t t y y R r − + − + + = γ π π β π  
  According to equation (1), short-term nominal interest rate in period t (rt) is the sum of 
the current rate of inflation for that period ( t π )  and the 'equilibrium real interest rate'  ) (
*
t R . The 
1 It could be useful to make a visit to the Monetary Policy Rule Home of John Taylor in:  
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magnitude of the real interest rate is adjusted in response to deviations of either 
contemporaneous inflation from his target  ) (
* π π − t or real output from his potential level 
) ( t t y y −  weighted positively by the parameters  ) 1 ( − β and  γ , respectively. Therefore, for 
1 > β  and  0 > γ , when the current rate of inflation is above his target (
* π π > t ) or the output 
gap is positive ( t t y y > ), the Taylor rule suggests to raise nominal interest rate and vice versa. 
The Taylor rule assumes that real interest rates play a central role in formulating 
monetary policy. Although the instrument of monetary policy is the nominal interest rate, the 
real interest rate is what affects real economic activity in different ways. This assumption 
explains why β must be greater than one. The rule also gives a basic role to the objectives of 
monetary policy, that is, macroeconomic stabilization and price stability. Thus, the estimated 
magnitudes and signs of the parameter β and  γ  provide information about the sensibility of 
those objectives to different shocks.  
  In his original paper, Taylor (1993) applied this equation to the setting of short-term 
nominal interest rate (federal fund rates) by the Federal Reserve Bank of United States between 
1987 and 1992. Nevertheless, Taylor did not econometrically estimate this equation. He 
assumed that the weights the Federal Reserve gave to deviations of inflation and output were 
both equal to 0.5 (in terms of equation (1),  5 . 0 1 = = − γ β ); furthermore, he assumed that the 
inflation target and the equilibrium real interest rate were both equal to 2 percent ( 2
* * = = t t R π ). 
His results showed that a simple rule of this kind seemed to fit very closely the behaviour of 
federal fund rates during that period and, therefore, he concluded that those results were a proof 
that a simple monetary policy rule could be used by monetary authorities as a guideline for 
achieving their main goals. 
  The original Taylor rule has been carefully examined and estimated trying to find a 
Taylor-type rule that fits closely the reaction functions for different central banks.  
  Thus, the first extension has been the econometrical estimation of the reaction function 
weights, rather than choosing parameters as Taylor did. Among others, we must refer to the 
papers of Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000), Gerlach and Schnabel (2000), Nelson (2000) 
or Doménech, Ledo and Taguas (2002). 
  Clearly, the implications of a Taylor-type rule for the cyclical behaviour of the economy 
will depend on the sign and magnitude of the estimated coefficients, β  and γ . Thus, if  1 > β , 
changes in nominal interest rate will have a stabilizing effect over the economy, since an centrA:
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces
A:
5
increase in inflation will be accompanied by an increase of the ex-post real interest rates. 
However, if  1 ≤ β , the monetary policy will tend to be accommodative since in this case the 
increase in inflation will be accompanied by a decrease of ex-post real interest rates. The same 
logic applies to the sign of the parameter γ , i.e. γ  must be always greater than zero, otherwise 
monetary policy will be accommodative of shocks to the real output. 
  In addition to the econometrical estimation of the parameters, other extensions of the 
original Taylor rule have been the introduction of meaningful changes in the basic form of the 
reaction function for the central banks, although they represent the same general framework for 
policy. Here, two extensions can be emphasized. 
  The first one captures the tendency showed by different central banks to adjust interest 
rates in a gradual fashion to their target levels, that is, to smooth changes in interest rates 
(Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1999). The basic aim of this behaviour is to avoid instability and 
uncertainty in capital markets as a result of sharp changes in interest rates. Taylor-type rules that 
take into account this fact can be found, among others, in the papers of Judd and Rudebusch 
(1998) and Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998, 2000). 
  The second extension refers to the way that policymakers form their beliefs and their 
expectations about the future path of inflation and output gap. In this respect, expectations can 
be formed based either on lagged data of these variables (backward looking specification; see, 
e.g., Kozicki, 1999) or on forward data and forecast of the same (forward looking specification; 
see, e.g., Clarida, Galí and Gertler, 1998 and 2000, or Batini and Haldane, 1999). 
  
3 A Bank of Spain's reaction function for monetary policy: 1978-1998 
  Our Taylor-type rule specification take into account both extensions, interest rate 
smoothing and the process through policymakers form their expectations. Thus, we consider the 
following policy reaction function to analyse Spanish monetary policy during the period 1978-
1998, which is a modification of previous equation (2): 




t y E E r r Ω + − Ω + = + +
~ ) ( γ π π β  
where 
ob
t r  is the desired short-term nominal interest rate by the central bank in period t,  
ob r  is 
the defined target for nominal interest rate,  i t+ π  is the rate of inflation in period t+i, 
ob π  is the 
target for inflation and  j t y +
~  is the output gap measured as the percent change of real output with 
respect to its long run trend level, that is,  ). ( ~
j t j t j t y y y + + + − =  Finally, E is the expectation centrA:
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces
A:
6
operator conditioned to the array of information available to the central bank at time t, when it 
forms its expectations,  t Ω . 
  According equation (3), each period t the central bank decides its desired nominal 
interest rate for that period 
ob
t r which adjusts relative to its target for interest rate in response to 
departures of either expected inflation and output gap from their respective targets. 
  We also suppose that central banks have a clear tendency to smooth movements in 
interest rates, so the actual interest rate only adjusts partially to the target, that is, actual interest 
rate is a weighted average between the target interest rate at time t and interest rate at time t – 1: 
(4)             1 ) 1 ( − + − = t
ob
t t r r r ρ ρ  
where  1 0 ≤ ≤ ρ is an indicator of the degree of smoothing of nominal interest rate changes. 
  The specification of Taylor-type rule in equation (3) allow us to introduce different time 
horizons on the part of the central bank about the way it forms its expectations, whereas 
equation (4) allows take into account interest rate smoothing. 
  Combining equations (3) and (4) yields: 
(5)          [] [] {} 1
~ ) ( ) 1 ( − + + + Ω + Ω + − − = t t j t t i t
ob ob
t r y E E r r ρ γ π β βπ ρ  
and, writing (5) in terms of realized variables: 
(6)          t t j t i t t v r y r + + − + − + − = − + + 1
~ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ρ γ ρ βπ ρ α ρ  
where  ) (
ob ob r βπ α − ≡ , and the error term, vt, is a linear combination of the forecast errors of 
inflation and output gap. 
 
[] [] { } ) ~ ~ ( ) ( ) 1 ( t j t j t t i t i t t y E y E v Ω − + Ω − − − ≡ + + + + γ π π β ρ  
 
  To estimate equation (6) and get the values of parameters ( ρ γ β α , , , ) we use 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (A survey can be seen in Pérez Rodríguez, 1994). Let 
t t u Ω ∈  be a vector of instrumental variables that are orthogonal to the error term vt. This vector 
can include any lagged values of explanatory variables, as well as any contemporaneous values 
of variables that are uncorrelated with the error term, then  []0 = t t u v E . Estimating by GMM, 
we have applied the Newey and West (1987) standard errors adjustment so the estimates are 
robust to serial correlation and heterocedasticity problems. 
  Finally, it is possible to use the parameter estimates to get the implicit central bank's centrA:
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inflation rate target for a particular period. Thus, given that  ) (
ob ob r βπ α − ≡ , this implies: 









where we include the additional assumption that, if the sample is long enough, we can use the 
sample average nominal interest rate to provide a valid estimate of 
ob r . 
  We have used quarterly time series data of the following variables (sources in 
parentheses): 
  - The interbank monetary market daily interest rates in annual terms (Main Economic 
Indicators, OECD). 
  - The inflation rate is the percent change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the 
previous four quarters (Spanish Institute of Statistics, INE). Instead of alternative inflation 
measures like GNP deflator, we have choice CPI because it comprises national and international 
prices and the exchange rate and therefore it is more suitable for open economies than other 
alternative measures (Svensson, 2000). 
  - The output gap is the percentage difference between GDP and its long run linear trend. 
The time series data are from the “Contabilidad Nacional trimestralizada” (INE)
2. 
  The instrument set includes four lagged values of each explanatory variable. 
 
3.1 Baseline specification 
In order to estimate equation (6), we have split the sample period into two periods. The 
first one (1978:2-1989:2) coincides with the period previous to the joining of the peseta to the 
SME. During those years, a stage of monetary control characteristic of a “closed economy” 
(Ayuso and Escrivá, 1997), is followed by a stage of transition to the integration in the SME. 
For that reason, our starting point will be 1978, when the Bank of Spain announces its monetary 
control target, and when the expectations on the future prices began to play a key role. 
During the second period (1989:2-1998:4), monetary policy turns to be explicitly 
more concerned about controlling inflation by adjusting interest rates. This period coincide 
with the participation of the peseta in the EMS, and with an increase in the degree of 
openness of the Spanish economy. The ending point is January 1999, when Spain joins the 
EMU. 
As can be seen in Figure 1, after the integration in the EMS the interest rate, the 
2 We also calculated logarithmic deviations from quadratic and cubic trends, (as well as the H-P filter) but it was centrA:
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inflation and the output gap describe a similar path. 
[Figure 1] 
This division of the sample allows us to analyse the model in two defined periods. 
First, for a “closed economy” in transition to a new feature of monetary control (Ayuso and 
Escrivá, 1997). Second, for a monetary policy oriented to take into account the characteristics 
of an “open economy”. This kind of analysis is on line with the paper by Clarida, Galí and 
Gertler (2000), where they estimate a monetary policy reaction function for the US economy, 
before and after Volcker’s appointment as Fed Chairman. For the Spanish economy would 
have been quite interesting to estimate a reaction function before and after the Law of 
Autonomy of the Bank of Spain in 1994, but the second period would have been too short. 
For that reason, we take as time reference the joining of the peseta to the EMS. 
As a first approximation, we estimate by OLS the simplest version of the Taylor rule, 
where in terms of equation (6) we have (ρ  = 0, i = 0, j = 0). Next, we allow for the interest 
rate smoothing introducing lagged values for the interest rate. Finally, we estimate by GMM 
and show estimates for three of the possible combinations of the variables’ time horizon (i = -
1, j = 0), (i = 0, j = 0) and (i = 1, j = 0). This allows us to contrast the backward looking 
specification for the inflation expectations, against the forward-looking specification
3.  
 
3.1.1 The transition years of monetary policy: 1978-1989 
From the beginning of the seventies, Spanish monetary policy was oriented to the money 
stock control (Aríztegui, 1990). However, the money aggregate target was not announced until 
1978. Regarding monetary policy design, the period between years 1978 and 1979 is 
characterised by money control in two levels. In this feature, M3 was the intermediate target, 
and the ACSB were the instrumental variable. The main implication of choosing a money 
aggregate as intermediate target, was the need for allowing fluctuations in interest rates and in 
exchange rates, in order to sustain the money aggregate and the instrumental variable in their 
desired levels. On the other hand, capital controls proved to be a severe constraint for the 
monetary policy during those years. Capital controls imposed a limit on the integration process 
by affecting the degree of the Spanish economy openness (Ayuso and Escrivá, 1997). 
The characteristics of the Spanish economy, would allow us to deduce that would be 
deviation from the linear trend, which better fits the data.
3 Other possibilities, available upon request, were computed. But we only report those, which showed the best 
results.centrA:
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difficult to describe monetary policy by a Taylor-type rule during this period. Table I reports the 
estimates for the first period of our sample (1978:1-1989:2). The starting point is 1979:1, but for 
equation (I.3) which starts in 1980:1 in order to avoid to include data prior to 1978 in the 
backward looking specification. 
[Table I] 
Values for α,  β,  γ  and ρ  are shown, joint with the implicit inflation target, π
ob, obtained 
from equation (7). When computing this value, we have take as estimate of the long-run 
nominal interest rate the sample average ex post interest rates r
ob = 14.3. In a similar way, the 
reference inflation target was computed as an average of the annual announced target (Informe 
de Coyuntura Económica, Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda) obtaining π
ob = 6.68. 
Equations (I.1) and (I.2) have been estimated by OLS. Values for the adjusted R
2, and 
the Durbin-Watson are reported. In equations (I.3), (I.4) and (I.5) we have used the GMM 
procedure, and we also show the values for the adjusted R
2, the Hansen’s J-test of the model’s 
overidentifiying restrictions, and the Ljung-Box Q-test of fourth order autocorrelation. Equation 
(I.3), which includes backward looking expectations for inflation, shows significant coefficients 
and expected signs for its estimates. But the only value according with the literature is the value 
of the output gap. The value for inflation is lower than one, and the degree of interest rate 
smoothing is also too low. However, the implicit inflation target (7.76) is the closest to the 
reference target (6.43). Equation (I.4), with current values for inflation and output gap, shows 
similar results. The same occurs when we allow for forward-looking expectations for inflation 
in (I.5), although we can observe the lack of significance of output gap, and that the implicit 
inflation target (9.41) amplifies its distance from the reference value. 
In conclusion, the original specification of the Taylor rule does not describe properly the 
interest rate path, even when smoothing changes in the interest rate. Moreover, both the 
backward looking and the forward-looking specifications do not show the expected values. The 
same happens with the implicit inflation target obtained from the constant of the equation. The 
estimates show fourth order autocorrelation, but the results do not improve when we correct it
4.  
Those findings are product of the Spanish politic and economic situation during the 
years considered. The heterogeneity of both the monetary policy design, and the implementation 
of their instruments could explain that the Taylor rule does not work for characterizing the 
evolution of the short-term nominal interest rates.   
 centrA:
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3.1.2 Monetary policy in the EMS 
After 1989, the Spanish monetary policy faced a external constraint imposed by the 
EMS commitments on exchange rate stability. At the same time, the monetary management was 
implicitly forced to follow the Bundesbank’s monetary policy focused on controlling inflation. 
In this scenario, and given the increasing role played by the short-term interest rates during this 
period, the reaction function of the Bank of Spain reveals a big effort to control inflation. 
Estimates for the second period of the sample (1989:3 – 1998:4) are shown in Table II. 
But for the forward-looking specification (II.5) we conclude in 1997:4 since we are introducing 
year-ahead values of the data. The estimate of the nominal interest rate target is r
ob = 9.90 and 
the long-run inflation target π
ob = 4.38. In the same way that was reported in Table I, we also 
show the OLS estimates for the Taylor rule in this period (II.1) and (II.2). Both the signs and the 
coefficients are according with the available literature. The smoothing parameter ρ  reveals a 80 
per cent of interest rate inertia. Estimates of inflation and output gap are greater than 2  and 
lower than 1 respectively; although are not significant those for the output gap. A remarkable 
result is that the implicit inflation target obtained from equations II.1 and II.2 (4.73 and 5.60) 
not differ much from the reference target, π
ob = 4.38. 
[Table II] 
When using GMM procedure (equations II.3, II.4 and II.5) results are quite similar. But 
the backward looking specification (equation II.3) seems to describe more accurately the interest 
rate evolution during the period. The estimates have the expected sign and are significant, the 
value for the adjusted R
2 is the highest, and there is not fourth order autocorrelation. This 
specifications suggests that a rise in the previous period inflation of one per cent induces the 
monetary authorities to raise nominal interest rates 2.30 per cent. In the same way, a rise in the 
current output gap of one per cent induces the monetary authorities to raise nominal interest 
rates 0.39 per cent. The implicit inflation target is 5.35. Those results would support the 
conclusion  that the Bank of Spain would have been more concerned about inflation than about 
output stability. 
Figure 2 shows both the actual and the fitted interest rate data for the second period. 
According to the residual, we can recognize the EMS instability between 1992 and 1993. 
[Figure 2] 
On the other hand, our baseline values β  = 2.30, γ  = 0.39 and ρ  = 0.63, are close to those 
4 Results available upon requestcentrA:
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obtained in the papers mentioned above (β  between 1.5 and 2; γ  between 0.07 and 0.8; and ρ  
between 0.18 and 0.93). Most of those papers estimate forward-looking specifications, and use a 
different sample period. For example, in the forward-looking rule developed by Doménech, 
Ledo and Taguas (2002), for the whole EMU during 1983-1999, the values are  β  = 1.62, γ  = 
0.80 and ρ  = 0.88. From this we can conclude that the Bank of Spain would have follow a 
monetary policy rule more sensitive to inflation than the whole EMU in average. When 
comparing with the backward looking specification in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000), for the 
US in the Volcker-Greenspan era (1979-1996), we found that their results β  = 1.72, γ  = 0.34 and 
ρ  = 0.71, are quite similar to ours. But the Spanish effort on controlling inflation proves to be 
greater again. 
[Chart 1] 
It seems to be clear that the Bank of Spain focused on controlling inflation. This goal 
acquired special relevance after the peseta joined the EMS. During those years, Spanish 
inflation was higher than that of the countries participating in the EEC, and the domestic 
demand was increasing strongly. In an environment of high international capital mobility, in 
spite of the capital controls, the restrictive monetary policy contributed to the peseta 
appreciation, and was not able to reach simultaneously the internal and the external objective. 
Fiscal policy neither was appropriate, since it was procyclical and the public deficit continued 
growing.  
Later, after the episodes of instability experienced by the EMS between 1992 and 1993, 
and the widening of the fluctuation bands in August 1993, Spanish monetary policy focused 
explicitly on controlling inflation. This decision was accompanied by the independence statute 
of the Bank of Spain, and by the change in the design of the money control in a single level. 
This new way of policy management consisted in fixing an explicit target for inflation, oriented 
to reach price stability in the short or in the long run.  
 
3.2 Alternative specifications 
In this section, we re-estimate our backward-looking baseline (equation II.3) using 
two different alternatives. Both of them have been computed for the two periods considered 
previously, by the GMM estimation procedure. Four lagged values of each explanatory 
variable have been used as instruments. 
The first modification (equations III.1 and IV.1) consists in introducing inflation centrA:
Fundación Centro de Estudios Andaluces
A:
12
expectations following Fuhrer and Moore (1995), as an average of that variable lagged one 
period prior to the current year and anticipated one period ahead. In this way, the inflation 
measure would be:  () 1 1 2
1
+ − + = t t π π π  
In the second modification (equations III.2, III.3, IV.2 and IV.3) we follow Clarida, 
Galí and Gertler (1998) by includiying an additional variable, zt. Then, the alternative 
specification turns in: 
(8)          t t t j t i t t z r y r ε θ ρ ρ γ ρ βπ ρ α ρ + − + + − + − + − = − + + ) 1 ( ~ ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( 1  
Equation (8) is just an extension of our baseline (6), where θ  captures the interest rate 
response to the additional variable considered, being ε t the error term. We will focus on the 
case where the values are (i = -1, j = 0) given that, as showed before, this specification proves 
to be the best one when fitting the interest rate evolution. 
As an additional variable we propose in first place, the deviations of a monetary 
aggregate from its target, mt. After 1978, the Bank of Spain began to announce as 
intermediate objective M3, which was replaced later (1983) by the ALP. For the first period 
of our sample, the monetary aggregate has been introduced as a logarithmic deviation of the 
money stock from the announced target (M3 before 1983, ALP after). For the second period, 
we have used ALP growth since the information for the whole period is not available. The 
Boletín Estadístico of the Bank of Spain has provided the data source. 
In order to evaluate the increasing role that exchange rates played, from the eighties, 
on the monetary policy conducted by the Bank of Spain, the second additional variable 
included is the exchange rate indicator relevant for the central bank, et. Before 1986 the 
observed variable was the nominal exchange rate versus developed countries. After joining 
the European Economic Community (EEC) the variable was the nominal exchange rate 
versus countries participating in the EEC (Escrivá and Santos, 1991). The reason was that 
exchange rate stability was considered a requirement for the integration process success. But, 
given that the DM was the leader currency of the EMS, and also was the nominal anchor for 
the “European” countries from 1988, the relevant variable turned to be the bilateral nominal 
exchange rate of the peseta versus the DM. We have used the nominal exchange rate versus 
developed countries for the first period of our sample, and the nominal exchange rate of the 
peseta versus the DM for the second. (The data source has been provided by the Boletín 
Estadístico of the Bank of Spain). centrA:
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Estimates are shown in Tables III and IV where values of θ  are provided, which capture the 
real interest rate responses to the additional variables considered. As can be seen, results are 
in line with those of the previous section (see Tables I and II). 
For the first period (Table III), we obtain signs and coefficients quite close to those 
expected for the inflation and the output gap, when introducing inflation as an average of 
backward and forward values (equation III.1). However, the degree of interest rate smoothing 
 is below the expected (ρ  = 0.19). Worse results are found when introducing the monetary 
aggregate (see III.2) and the exchange rate (see III.3). In the former, inflation does not appear 
to be significant and the implicit inflation target increases strongly (57.41 versus the 6.68 
reference value). In contrast, the monetary aggregate is significant and shows the expected 
sign. That result would allow us to conclude that the nominal interest rate path might be 
explained by monetary variables during the first period of our sample. On the other hand, 
when introducing the exchange rate, all the variables but the exchange rate are significant and 
show the expected sign. For those reasons is difficult to describe this period by a Taylor rule. 
[Table III] 
  In contrast, better results are obtained for the second period (Table IV). We can see 
(IV.1) that when introducing inflation as an average of lagged values, the estimates are on line 
with the expected values. An also, when we include the monetary aggregate (which is not 
significant) the rest of variables (IV.2) do not differ much from the backward looking 
baseline shown in Table II. Similar conclusions can be reached when introducing the 
exchange rate (IV.3), and moreover, the values for β,  γ   and  ρ  (2.13, 0.33 and 0.61 
respectively) are quite close to those obtained in the baseline (2.30, 0.39 and 0.63 
respectively). We can conclude that the inclusion of additional variables does not change the 
basic results obtained previously for the second period of our sample, and this result could 
support the robustness of our baseline specification (II.3). 
[Table IV] 
  Finally, trying to check the robustness of our baseline specification (II.3), we included 
other additional variables such as federal funds rate (ft), German interest rate (gt),  and the 
nominal exchange rate peseta-$ (dt) (The data source has been provided by Main Economic 
Indicators, OECD, and the Boletín Estadístico of the Bank of Spain, respectively). In 
particular, the German interest rate does not appear to be significant and the coefficient does 
not show the expected sign (equation V.II), and the implicit inflation target increase when centrA:
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introducing any of the additional variables. But in spite of that, the results (reported in Table 
V) show that the coefficients for the inflation and the output gap are not the expected (since 
for all of them β  < 1, and γ  < 0.5). 
The underlying conclusions are in line with the basic results previously reported; i.e., 
the evolution of interest rates during the second period of our sample could be described by a 




4. The usefulness of a monetary policy rule when dealing with inflation 
  The Taylor rule gives short-term interest rate a central role in monetary policy, 
through the real short-term interest rate, to achieve the objectives of inflation and 
stabilization. According to this, monetary policy authorities should set “high” nominal 
interest rate when inflation is above its target, or when the output is above its long-term trend. 
In terms of equations (2) and (3) in section 2, β  should be greater than one. 
 Our  results,  (β  = 2.30 in the baseline), support that the evolution of the nominal 
interest rate would have been focused on controlling inflation. But after the adoption of the 
European Central Bank’s monetary policy in January 1999, a higher inflation can be observed 
in Spain. In order to study the implications of this fact, we will check the robustness of our 
findings by recursive estimates of the coefficient on inflation, β . Next, we will provide some 
forecast for the nominal interest rate after 1999 conducted by an independent monetary policy 
instead of the ECB’s common policy. 
 
4.1.1. Recursive estimates of ββββ
5555  
Our result β  = 2.3 for the period 1989:3-1998:4 is clearly higher than β  = 1.5 of the 
Taylor rule. The period of analysis includes relevant episodes such as the joining of the peseta 
to the EMS in August 1989, the instability experienced by the EMS between 1992 and 1993, 
the widening of the fluctuation bands in August 1993, and the independence  of the Bank of 
Spain in 1994. For that reason it would be interesting to check the stability of the coefficient 
on inflation target. 
Figure 3 shows the recursive estimations of β . Its value has been always above 2, 
5 We gratefully acknowledge Oscar Bajo-Rubio and an anonymous referee for this suggestion. centrA:
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reaching the highest values in the middle of 1994 and in 1998. After that date, the lower 
values of β  could indicate a certain degree of “relax” of the monetary policy, given the 
imminent constitution of the EMU. This result could support the idea that in spite of the 
external goal of the exchange rate imposed by the EMS discipline, the convergence towards 
the German monetary policy encouraged the Spanish monetary policy to achieve the internal 
goal of inflation. 
[Figure 3] 
 
4.1.2. Nominal interest rate forecast
6 
The Spanish case could be of interest given that, with an inflation above the European 
average, was able to conduct its monetary policy according to the requirements of the 
integration and convergence process towards EMU. Moreover, our results confirm that the 
Spanish monetary authorities were concerned about inflation and that they would have follow 
a Taylor-type rule. 
But in the last years, after the adoption of a common monetary policy, we can observe 
a continuous increase of inflation in Spain. Could be due to a (common) “more relaxed” 
monetary policy? What would have happened if the Bank of Spain would have conducted an 
independent monetary policy after 1999? In order to answer those questions, we have 
computed the forecast for the nominal interest rate following the Taylor-type rule of our 
baseline specification, two years ahead 1999. 
[Chart 2] 
Chart 2 shows observed values and estimates of the nominal interest rate, being the 
estimates higher than the observed values. This result confirm that the Spanish monetary 
policy would have been more concerned about inflation than the ECB and that, after the 
adoption of a common monetary policy, it would be necessary another economic policies to 
support European monetary policy when dealing with inflation. 
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper we try to evaluate whether the monetary policy performed by the Bank of 
Spain during the period 1978-1998, could be described by a Taylor-type rule taking into account 
the open economies’ conditioning factors. To that end, we estimate a equation for the short-term 
nominal interest rate, which responds to the inflation rate, measured by CPI deviations, and to centrA:
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the output gap whit respect its long-run target. We also consider two extensions of the original 
specification. Firstly, we allow for different ways of introducing expectations (backward 
looking, forward looking and their average), and, secondly, we consider the possibility of 
smoothing changes in interest rates. Finally, we introduce additional variables such as a 
monetary aggregate and the exchange rate. 
We have divided the sample into two periods, delimited by the date of June 1989, when 
the peseta joined the EMS. This is the date when we observe a significant monetary policy shift. 
The two-step design of monetary control (i.e., to fix an intermediate target conducted by an 
instrumental variable), was followed by a single-step design based in controlling inflation 
through adjusting the interest rates structure. 
After estimating the reaction function of the Bank of Spain, the results appear clearly 
different when comparing the two periods. For the first one (1978:1- 1989:2), estimates show 
the expected sings but their values are far away from those founded in the available literature. 
Particularly, coefficients of inflation and the degree of interest rate smoothing appear to be too 
low. So, we conclude that a Taylor-type rule does not describe the evolution of interest rates in 
Spain. Moreover, the results do not improve when we extend the baseline specification .  
On the contrary,  estimates of the second period (1989:2-1998:4) are more satisfactory. 
We found significant coefficients, together with expected signs and values close to those of the 
literature. The response of nominal interest rate to changes in inflation is around 2 per cent, the 
degree of output gap stabilisation is lower than 0.5 per cent, and the degree of interest rate 
smoothing is between 0.6 and 0.8 per cent. Those results hardly change when we extend the 
baseline specification, and this could support that our results are robust. Finally, and taking into 
account similar studies, we can conclude that the Bank of Spain, after the joining of the peseta 
to the EMS, would have follow Taylor-type rule. 
When checking the robustness of our results by the recursive estimates of the coefficient 
on inflation, and by the nominal interest rate forecast, we find evidence for supporting that the 
convergence towards the German monetary policy encouraged the Spanish monetary policy to 
achieve the internal goal of inflation. But this finding turns to be an open question if we take 
into account the higher inflation observed after joining EMU: To what extent are we paying the 
costs of a common (and more relaxed) monetary policy? Are monetary policy rules enough to 
control inflation? 
 
6 We are in debt with Ramón María-Dolores for suggesting us this extension of our analysis. centrA:
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Sample period: 79:1-89:2, Dependent variable: short-term nominal interest rate 
Restrictions and statistics of equation (6)  αααα       ββββ       γγγγ       ρρρρ       ππππ
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-  t-statistics in parentheses 
-  In equation (I.3) the sample is 80:1-89:2 and the reference for π
ob = 6.43. For the rest of equations the 
reference is π
ob = 6.68. 
-  Critic values for J, chi-squared(8) are 13.4 at 10%, and 15.5 at 5% 
-  Critic values for Q, chi-squared(4) are 7.78 at 10%, and 9.49 at 5% 
 
TABLE II 
Sample period: 89:3-98:4, Dependent variable: short-term nominal interest rate 
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-  t-statistics in parentheses 
-  In equation (II.5) the sample is 89:3-97:4 and the reference for π
ob = 4.63. For the rest of equations the 
reference is π
ob = 4.38. 
-  Critic values for J, chi-squared(8) are 13.4 at 10%, and 15.5 at 5% 
-  Critic values for Q, chi-squared(4) are 7.78 at 10%, and 9.49 at 5% centrA:







Sample period: 80:1-89:2, Dependent variable: short-term nominal interest rate 
Restrictions and statistics of equation (8)  αααα       ββββ       γγγγ       ρρρρ       θθθθ       ππππ
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-  t-statistics in parentheses, the reference for the inflation target is π
ob = 6.43 
-  In equation (III.1) the critic values for J, chi-squared(8) are 13.4 at 10%, and 15.5 at 5% 
-  In equations (III.2) and (III.3) the critic values for J, chi-squared(11) are 17.3 at 10%, and 19.7 at 5% 





Sample period: 89:3-98:4, Dependent variable: short-term nominal interest rate 
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-  t-statistics in parentheses, the reference for the inflation target is π
ob = 4.38 
-  In equation (IV.1) the critic values for J, chi-squared(8) are 13.4 at 10%, and 15.5 at 5% 
-  In equations (IV.2) and (IV.3) the critic values for J, chi-squared(11) are 17.3 at 10%, and 19.7 at 5% 
-  Critic values for Q, chi-squared(4) are 7.78 at 10%, and 9.49 at 5% centrA:






Sample period: 89:3-98:4, Dependent variable: short-term nominal interest rate 
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-  t-statistics in parentheses, the reference for the inflation target is π
ob = 4.38 








AUTHORS DATA  SPECIFICATION
     
ββββ      
     
γγγγ      
     
ρρρρ      
backward-looking  2.30 0.39  0.63   




forward-looking  2.13 0.06  0.65 
Doménech, Ledo and Taguas (2002)  EMU 
1983-1999 
forward-looking  1.62 0.80  0.88 




forward-looking  2.15 0.93  0.79 
Gerlach and Schnabel (2000)  EMU-11 
1990-1998 
contemporaneous  1.58 0.45  −  
Bundesbank 
1979-1993 
forward-looking  1.31 0.25  0.91 
B. of Japan 
1979-1999 
forward-looking  2.04 0.08  0.93 
FED 
1979-1999 
forward-looking  1.79 0.07  0.92 
B. of England 
1979-1990 
forward-looking  0.98 0.19  0.92 
B. of France 
1983-1989 
forward-looking  1.13 0.88  0.95 
Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) 
B. of Italy 
1981-1989 
forward-looking  0.90 0.22  0.95 
Taylor (1993)  FED 
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OBSERVED VALUES AND ESTIMATES OF 
NOMINAL INTEREST RATE 
 OBSERVED  ESTIMATES   
1999:I 3.07  3.42 
1999:II 2.61  3.36 
1999:III 2.68  3.46 
1999:IV 3.40  3.66 
2000:I 3.52  4.53 
2000:II 4.26  4.85 
2000:III 4.73  5.61 
2000:IV 4.75  6.33 
 
Note: The estimates have been computed using the backward-
looking specification in Table II. 
 